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Abstract— When an IP network is unable to provide
users with demanded services, it usually outsources to
other networks. Outsourcing will involve the process of
authenticating users for services over IP networks. The
process can become complex when different networks
have different authentication schemes, in which users are
required to provide varying sets of information for service
authentication. In this paper, we propose a new service
authentication protocol by means of which many networks
are linked together forming an ad hoc network system.
This ad hoc network system will provide an aggregated
range of services to users. Individual networks within the
system retain their own authentication schemes and the
result of user authentication can be relayed to other net-
works within the system. We argue that with this protocol,
the burden of collecting authentication information and
obtaining authentication for each outsourced service is
alleviated. We also demonstrate how to construct a service
authentication framework and apply the protocol in two
case studies.
Keywords— autonomous network, service authenti-
cation, outsource service, authentication propagation,
authentication token.
I. INTRODUCTION
Within an IP network community, a user needs to
register himself with a local network to enjoy all the
services available on the network. The range of avail-
able services is often one of the determining factors
for a user when choosing a network. However, it is
difficult for a single network to provide users with
all the services they want due to technological and
financial limitations. To overcome these constraints
the range of services is supplemented by those pro-
vided by other autonomous networks. This process
of utilizing services provided by other networks is
referred to as service outsourcing.
To establish the identity of a user for an out-
sourced service, either the user authenticates directly
to the target network or server, or the authentication
status from a local network can be transmitted to the
target network or server. Various approaches to au-
thenticate a user have been suggested. For instance,
use of ISO X.509 [12] certificates which require a
common third party or trust recommendations [6] [7]
and trust establishment [1] [2] [8] [3] [9] which
requires a common set of trust agents have been pro-
posed. A service authentication protocol in which a
local network authenticates a user and automatically
relays the authentication status to its linked networks
with minimum initial set up overheads is desirable.
When autonomous networks are linked together
for service outsourcing, they form a graph of net-
works. In a graph of networks, each arc represents an
outsourcing relationship which could can be a one-
way or a dual relationship between the requesting
network and the targeted network. We will refer to
such a graph of networks as the service network
graph (SNG).
When a service is outsourced, the target network
must be able to authenticate users and to assign
the appropriate authorizations to users’ requests. As
the service outsourcing may involve many networks
and different target networks may have different
authentication schemes, users in an SNG may be
required to have different sets of authentication in-
formation. The outsourcing process will not appear
to be seamless if a user has to collect and present
the authentication information to the target network
itself. While collecting and maintaining many sets
of authentication information is not a trivial task,
authentication and authorization information should
be forwarded to target networks by the local network
to facilitate seamless service outsourcing. Practical
and secure authentication methods are required to
extend the range of services which a network can
provide by outsourcing.
Service outsourcing is not effective if the list of
available services, both local and outsourced, is not
up to date. When an autonomous network links to
an SNG, it should update its list of services with
the new services made available through the SNG.
Depending on the outsourcing relationship, networks
in the SNG may have to update their lists of services
also. The updating of services should be dynamic as
autonomous networks may attach or detach from an
SNG at anytime.
In this paper, we will focus on how to make the
service outsourcing process seamless. We propose
a service authentication protocol and the associated
frame work for seamless service outsourcing.
In section II we identify the major issues of
service authentication and related work. In section III
a frame work for service authentication over IP
networks is proposed. The protocol for establishing
service authentication over IP networks is also ex-
plained. In section IV we will then look at how to
apply the service authentication protocol to service
outsourcing. Section V concludes the paper with a
discussion on future work.
II. PROBLEMS OF SERVICE AUTHENTICATION
AND RELATED WORK
Autonomous networks have their own authentica-
tion schemes and sets of authentication information
for their local users. Users must register as local
users before they can access the services offered by
a network. Service outsourcing involves more than
one autonomous network. Without the assistance
from the host network users would have to register
with multiple networks and maintain multiple sets
of authentication information. Even if the networks
have the same authentication scheme and the same
set of authentication information, users would have
to login to different servers for different services.
Kerberos [10] presented a user friendly solution
in which users authenticate with a central authen-
tication server and the authentication status can be
propagated to the required servers. With one set of
authentication information and one log-in, users will
be able to access services available from servers
within the same realm.
The problem with this approach is that users have
to keep track of the availability of services as they
have to specify which server and service they want
to access. Users must maintain an updated list of
services available by themselves.
The administrative work involved in setting up
realms makes Kerberos semi-static. If autonomous
networks attach and detach from an SNG in a dy-
namic fashion, we need a more responsive solution.
When many autonomous networks form an SNG,
the network administrators face a problem of au-
thenticating users from other networks which have
various authentication schemes and authentication
information sets. It is obvious that enforcing a
common authentication scheme is not feasible and
involves substantial administrative overheads. For
instance, when a network links to an SNG and
subsequently detaches from the graph, switching to
the common authentication scheme and reverting
back to the original authentication scheme requires
all users of the network to collect and present a
different set of authentication information. On the
other hand, maintaining a global set of authentication
data will fail as networks may link to the graph or
detach from the graph at any time. Even worse, some
networks may be reluctant to disclose the authenti-
cation data for security reasons. As a direct result of
this, other networks may not have the authentication
data required by the global authentication set. A
typical example is the X.500 [11] plan which has
never succeeded in producing a global database of
named entities.
A solution to this problem is the ISO X.509 [12]
recommendation which was published in 1993. Au-
thentication in X.509 is based on the secrecy of the
private key and the binding of the public key to
a user name. For instance, a Certificate Authority
(CA) authenticates a user and binds its name and
public key in a digital certificate. If a user demon-
strates (s)he is the owner of the private key with
a corresponding X.509 certificate, then (s)he is the
user named in the certificate. This authentication
mechanism is built upon the unanimous trust for the
Certificate Authority.
Note that an administrator of an autonomous net-
work may decide to set up a CA for the network or
empower a third party to run the CA. However, when
many autonomous networks form an SNG, they must
agree on a common CA to issue all certificates
or on CA certificate chaining. We envisage that
the workload increases with the number of users
involved.
Another approach is to establish a
trust [1] [2] [8] [3] [9]. Trust is the result of
an assessment of an entity relative to a domain
of action [5] by an observer. When an observer is
authorized by a network administrator to give trust
recommendations [6] [7], the observer becomes a
trust agent. The trust is represented by a token and
each trust token is signed by the trust agent.
It is reasonable for each autonomous network to
have its own set of independent trust agents. A user
will be asked to provide trust tokens from a few trust
agents. By using the aggregated result [4] of the trust
tokens, the server can determine the authentication
and authorization status of the user for the requested
service.
This way of authentication works fine for indi-
vidual networks. However, for an SNG, each au-
tonomous network will have its own set of trust
agents. Either all the networks adopt the same com-
mon set of trust agents or users have to collect trust
tokens from different sets of trust agents for services
outsourced by different networks.
An approach is to design a service authentica-
tion framework which allow autonomous networks
to link and detach from an SNG with minimum
administrative overhead while retaining their own
autonomy, independence and integrity. At the same
time, forming an SNG should not introduce extra
requirements for users.
Our research aims at a service authentication
protocol and the corresponding framework to allow
service authentication to be performed at the local
network and the authentication status to be propa-
gated automatically to other networks in the SNG.
III. PROPOSED PROTOCOL AND FRAMEWORK
In this section, we propose a Distributed Net-
works Service Authentication Protocol (DNSA) and
a framework for the protocol which allows seamless
service outsourcing in ad hoc SNG. The concept of
SNG is followed by the DNSA protocol.
A. Service Graph
The Distributed Networks Service Authentication
framework is based on autonomous networks and
SNG. We state our assumptions and define some
terms used in the framework in the following para-
graphs. An autonomous network is assumed to have
a number of local users (U) and the following service
providing hosts (S) as shown in Figure 1:
  Authentication Server (AS) which authenticates
local users,
  Server (S) which provides services,
  Service Locating Server (SLS) which stores
information about local services and outsourced
services.
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Fig. 1. An autonomous network
Next we assume that an encrypted channel authenti-
cates statements transmitted via the channel [13]. All
communications among autonomous networks and
between hosts within the same network are assumed
to be encrypted using the symmetric encryption
and symmetric encryption and decryption keys. For
instance, Server Key (  ) is the encryption and
decryption key shared between AS and S while
Session Key (  ) is the encryption and decryption
key shared between S and U and generated for each
log-in session.
Note that the distributed network from which an
outsourced service request is initiated is referred to
as the request network while the network which
provides the actual service is the target network.
Let us have a look at the relationship among
the  autonomous networks in Distributed Networks
Service Authentication.
We say that 	 attaches to 
 when:
 


 delegates its authentication authority to   .
In which case  
 generates and shares 



with   .
 



provides services to 

as outsourced ser-
vices of   .
Consequently, this is a one-way relationship. As
shown in Figure 2, 

attaches to 


and 


is the
delegator network while   is a delegatee network.
In other words, a delegatee network attaches to a
delegator network and this is a target network of the
delegatee network.
Moreover,   and  
 are defined to be mutually
linked when   attaches to  
 and  
 also attaches
to  . Mutual linking is therefore a dual-way rela-
tionship.
A Service Network Graph is a representation of
many networks attached to or mutually linked with
each other in which an attachment is represented by a
single-ended arrow and a mutual-link is represented
by a double-end arrow as depicted in Figure 2.
N1 N2
N3 N4
Fig. 2. A Service Graph
For instance, within Figure 2, each node stands for
an autonomous network (     
   and  ) where
 
  attaches to  
 and  .
 
  attaches to  
 .
 

 and  are mutually linked.
 
 
 does not attach or mutually link to any node.
With the Distributed Networks Service Authenti-
cation framework in place, we can now proceed to
look at the Distributed Networks Service Authenti-
cation Protocol.
B. Distributed Networks Service Authentication Pro-
tocol
The Distributed Networks Service Authentication
Protocol has two distinct operation modes. One is
the Network Participation mode (NP mode) in which
a network links to another network in an SNG.
Another is the User Service mode (US mode) in
which a user accesses a local or outsourced service.
We will discuss them in the following sections.
1) Protocol in NP Mode: Let us assume 	 and



are two separate autonomous networks as shown
in Figure 3.
Upon receiving the request from   to attach
directly to  
 ,  
 generates and sends  



 to


. 
	



also sends information about services
available for outsourcing to  	 

in the form of a
Service Path (P). A Service Path is a service locater
similar to a URL and represented by a string of
network path and costing metrics. An example is

Network Path/  Target Network/Server/Service 
:

 Cost Metrics 
where Network Path/  is optional. Services available
for outsourcing include local services in  
 and
those outsourced by 


. Both 

and  	 

will
acknowledge the receipt of information to 


and

	


 respectively. Note that  
 can also request to
attach to   and form a mutual link with   .
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Fig. 3. Attaching one network to another network
We will explain how to handle a service request
in section III-B.2.
2) Protocol in US Mode: When a local user 

in 

requests a service, it will first query 
	


whether it is available or not.  	   then returns a
message containing a valid service path (   or  

for example) plus its cost metrics or “Service not
available” to 

. If 

is comfortable with the cost
metrics, the user will authenticate itself to   and
pass along the service path and cost metrics which
  will use to determine the path to reach the target
server.
If the authentication is successful,   will gen-
erate a session key 

. If the service is available
on a local server 

as indicated by the Service
Path, 

will encrypt


using encryption key


of server   and send it to   .   acknowledges
the session key



and returns   all service
information for the request. 

relays the service
information and 

to 

as shown in Figure 4. If
the local server in   does not provide the service,

 needs to be outsourced to another network, say

 as shown in Figure 5. In this case,   retrieves
the authentication token key of 


,  



 and
uses it to encrypt the session key
 

instead of
using a server encryption key



. The encrypted
session key  

together with the service path forms
an authentication token.
On receiving the authentication token from   ,
the authentication server  
 in  
 extracts the


from the authentication token. From the service path
that was embedded in the authentication token, 


determines if the service is provided locally on  

or by networks other than   and  
 . If the service
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Fig. 4. User requesting a local service
is a local service provided by 


, 


encrypts
 

with




and sends it to  
 as explained before.
In the case when   does not attach directly to  

as shown in Figure 6 the service path would indicate
that a target network is only reachable via   . In
this case  

is passed on from 

to 


via
authentication server   in  . 

will encrypt



with  


 while   will encrypt



with




 . Service information returned from  
 will
follow a similar path but in the reverse order.
IV. APPLICATIONS OF THE DISTRIBUTED
NETWORKS SERVICE AUTHENTICATION
PROTOCOL
In this section, we illustrate the feasibility of the
protocol with two case studies as follows.
A. Subnets to Subnets
The autonomous network of domain usq.edu.au
belongs to University of Southern Queensland
(USQ). Under this network, a number of subnets
are created for individual Faculties. For instance,
a subnet of sub-domain sci.usq.edu.au was cre-
ated for the Faculty of Sciences (FoS) in which
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Fig. 5. User requesting an outsourced service
probus.sci.usq.edu.au (Probus) serves as a web server
and a file server.
We know the subnet of sci.usq.edu.au has no
independent authentication server. Authentication is
performed by individual servers using a centralized
Light Weight Access Protocol authentication infor-
mation repository (LDATA). Staff members of FoS
and student enrolled in programs offered by the
Faculty are all legitimate users of the subnet. Every
user of the subnet of sci.usq.edu.au has an entry in
LDATA.
If a user   from another subnet, say, subnet of
eng.usq.edu.au, wants to create a web site in Probus,

 has to register as a local user of sci.usq.edu.au.
Administrative work involves both user management
and network related administration. Here we demon-
strate how to use the Distributive Network Service
Authentication Protocol to do so.
A Distributive Network Service Authentication
framework requires a service network must have an
AS and a SLS. All servers within the networks use
the AS for service authentication. Finally all commu-
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Fig. 6. User requesting an outsourced service
nication within the network must be encrypted using
symmetric key encryption such as Data Encryption
Standard (DES), International Data Encryption Al-
gorithm (IDEA) and Rivest Cipher (RC5). Note that
communication with the SLS may be in plain text
form.
Due to the fact that the servers within the subnets
of sci.usq.edu.au and eng.usq.edu.au perform service
authentication on their own, and SLS does not exist
in both networks, we have to create an AS and a
SLS for each network
The functions of an AS include:
1) extracts user account name, password and ser-
vice path from an authentication request from
a user;
2) uses account name and password for authenti-
cation and retrieves the corresponding autho-
rization;
3) prepends user account and authorization to
service path to form authorized service path
(AP);
4) forms authentication token by generating and
encrypting


with ATK of AS in next hop
along the Service Path;
5) receives and extracts session keys from authen-
tication tokens and passes them on to local
server or AS in next hop as determined by the
Service Path;
6) relays service information returned from local
servers to AS in other networks;
7) forward service information to local servers or
AS in next hop as determined by the Service
Path;
8) uses the original LDATA for sci.usq.edu.au as
authentication information repository.
The SLS has the following functions:
1) being a Light Weight Access Protocol server;
2) creating a service path for all local services
within the network as 
 ./service  ;
3) converting service paths from delegator net-
work from 
 ./net path to S/S/service  to


./delegator net/net path to S/S/service  ;
Servers in the delegator network need to:
1) open up a service connection with every ses-
sion key passed to it from AS;
2) use session key for the connection to commu-
nicate with the client program;
3) close a connection when the service session
for the connection ends.
While on the delegatee network, the client program:
1) requests user input for service demanded;
2) requests Service Path from SLS;
3) requests user input for authentication informa-
tion;
4) passes service path along with authentication
information to AS;
5) upon receiving the session key and service
information from AS, connects to the server
and start the service session.
Note that each subnet may have an AS and an SLS
of its own.
B. Autonomous Networks
Similar to the subnet case discussed in section IV-
A, we have a case in which one of our research
projects requires the use of parallel computers for
complex system simulation and needs to access
the parallel computing facilities at the Australian
National University (ANU). To be able to use the
service, we have to submit user information as well
as service parameters to the ANU network. This
problem can be easily solved if our network can
attach to the ANU network and outsource the parallel
computing service.
Let us assume the network sci.usq.edu.au has
already been using the Distributed Network Service
Authentication Protocol with its own AS and SLS.
We describe here how to use the Distributive Net-
works Service Authentication Protocol to outsource
the service from the ANU network. The procedure
is similar to the previous case, i.e. installing an AS
and a SLS on the subnet of sci.usq.edu.au.
Note that the AS will:
1) receive and extract session keys from authen-
tication tokens and pass them on to servers
within the local network;
2) relay service information returned from local
servers to the AS in other networks;
The SLS will:
1) create a service path for all local services
within the network as 
 ./service  ;
2) convert the service paths from the delegator
network from 
 ./net path to S/S/service  to


./delegator net/net path to S/S/service  ;
Finally the client program on our subnet of
sci.usq.edu.au will:
1) request user input for simulation parameters;
2) request Service Path for parallel computing
service from SLS;
3) request user input for authentication informa-
tion;
4) pass service path along with authentication
information to AS;
5) connect to the server and start the parallel
computing service session upon receiving the
session key and service information from AS.
V. CONCLUSION
A user interested in a service available in a
distributed network environment has to establish a
trust relationship with a local network first. Each
time a service is requested, the network has to
authenticate the user before granting the user access
to any local or outsourced service. A service authen-
tication protocol which relays authentication status
from local network to target network is required
for outsourced services. In this paper, we have de-
signed the DNSA protocol which allows autonomous
networks to link together, forming an SNG. With
this protocol, authentication status is relayed from a
request network to a target network without any extra
input from the user. Local users of networks adopting
the DNSA protocol therefore need only authenticate
with its local authentication server. This makes the
protocol user-friendly and efficient and alleviates the
burden of collecting authentication information and
obtaining authentication for each outsourced service.
The extra entity required in the DNSA protocol is
only a service locating server which is capable of
listing services using service path.
Note that we have not included the granting and
revocation of service authorization in DNSA. We
will focus on DNSA authorization and security is-
sues in the future.
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